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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890657-CA
Priority No. 2

BRUCE AARON ELLIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1990)
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990)
Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1989)
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1989)
R. Evid. 403

STATEMENT OF THE IS8UES
Did the trial court err in precluding the jury from
considering the defendant's theory regarding the lesser included
offense of simple assault?
Did the trial court err when it denied the defendant's
motion to exclude the photographs marked State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Each party is . . . entitled to have the jury instructed on
the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it." State v. Torres.
619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980).
A trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of
potentially prejudicial photographs is subject to an "abuse of
discretion" standard.
1988).

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah

If the trial court erred in its decision, appellate courts

"must determine the harmfulness of the trial court's error."

Id.

"A conviction will not be reversed because of the erroneous admission
of evidence absent a showing that the error likely affected the
substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750,

754 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1989).

Following a two day jury trial

beginning on September 27f 1989, in the Third Judicial District
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Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Scott Daniels, presiding, the court sentenced Bruce Aaron Ellis to
an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison
and a $5000 fine (with a 25% surcharge).

(R 89).

the sentence and placed Bruce Ellis on probation.

The court stayed
(R 89).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 29, 1989, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Steven Drew
gave a co-worker, Stephen Evans, a ride home from work.

Transcript

of September 27, 1990, Trial Proceeding [hereinafter referred to as
"TA"] at 89. While proceeding towards their respective homes, the
two men noticed a parked pickup truck resembling a truck owned by
Dale Purdy, another co-worker who had not been at work that day.
(TA 59, 89). Drew and Evans then stopped by the truck, parked at a
location different than Purdy's actual residence, to ascertain if
Purdy was present.

(TA 60, 89).

Although Purdy was not there, his girlfriend, Diane
Konecny, was in the house situated by the truck.

(TA 137).

According to Dale Purdy, Diane "had taken [his] truck the night
before; had not come back."

(TA 118).

She did not return the

following morning, having apparently spent the night in the home of
the Defendant/Appellant, Bruce Ellis.

(TA 118, 155-56).

The truck

had not been stolen, (TA 73), though Diane had "asked [Ellis] if
[he] knew [someone] who would buy the truck from her.

(TA 136).

Purdy was thus stranded at his home, unable to travel to work
without the benefit of his truck.
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(TA 118).

Drew and Evans asked "several people standing [in] front"
of Ellis7 residence if Mr. Purdy or his girlfriend were around.
(TA 60).

Bruce Ellis approached Drew and Evans and, according to

the State's witnesses, discussed whether the truck should be sold
for an "eight ball."

(TA 62).

Drew and Evans departed for Purdy's

home to tell him that his truck may be sold.

(TA 72).

After Drew and Evans updated Dale Purdy with news of their
discovery, the State's witnesses admitted that "Mr. Purdy wasn't
happy in learning where his truck was[.]"

(TA 73).

Drew and Evans

both knew that Purdy was angry about Dianne leaving him.
The three men returned to confront Bruce Ellis.
did not return to confront Dianne Konecny.

(TA 74).

(TA 126).
The men

(TA 74).

Drew, Evans, and Purdy returned to a nearby location, the
driveway where the truck had been moved.

(TA 121). According to

Dale Purdy, he confronted Ellis and asked him if "he had seen Dianne
or knew anything about the truck parked out there."

(TA 122).

Purdy said Ellis told him, "she was not there, and [the truck] ran
out of gas[.]"

(TA 122).

Bruce Ellis, however, testified that he

told Purdy that Dianne was in the house.

(TA 137).

"[Purdy] went

back [in the house] and asked Dianne for the keys and she told him
no.

She told him that if he gave her her kids, she'd give him the

keys."

(TA 137).
Under either Purdy's or Ellis' version, after Purdy

returned to Drew and Evans one of two sequences of events occurred.
When Purdy told them he could not get the keys, Drew and Evans

- 4

-

approached Ellis through a front gate while Drew grabbed what
appeared to be a tire iron and came over the fence at Ellis.
Steven Drew threatened to "beat my [Ellis7] brains out

(TA 138).

. . . for being with Mr. Purdy's . . . girlfriend [Dianne
Konecny]."

(TA 156).

Ellis, drinking a glass of water at the time,

threw the glass at Steven Drew in an attempt to stop him from coming
over the fence.

(TA 139, 143). Bruce Ellis testified that he threw

it with his right hand.

(TA 143).

Ellis is left-handed.

(TA 143).

The alternative scenario submitted by the State alleged
that after Purdy told Drew and Evans that he could not get the keys,
the three men were passively content with finding the truck and
securing its return.

(TA 95).

This version, however, ignores the

testimony of Stephen Evans, the State witness who conceded that the
primary objective of the three men in returning to the scene was for
"the confrontation . . . with Mr. Ellis" as Mr. Purdy's girlfriend
"was nowhere around."

(TA 74).

According to Steven Drew, he calmly

asked Ellis, "Can we please have the keys so we can get out of
here?"

(TA 110).

Drew claimed that Ellis responded with profanity

and the two men then argued bitterly.

(TA 95).

Drew also contended

that Ellis "said, #I ought to kill you,' and he turned and he throws
the bottle at me and I duck and it catches the back of my leg."
(TA 95).

Drew testified that Ellis "threw it offhand," (TA 107),

from a distance of "ten to [twelve] feet."

(TA 96).

After Drew was hit, Purdy drove him to the hospital.
(TA 68, 97). No doctor worked on Drew's leg for "[t]he first hour
and a half" following his arrival at the hospital.
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(TA 103).

The

police apparently had requested photographs of the wound.

In one of

the pictures, State's Exhibit No. 7, the surgeon who treated Steven
Drew, Dr. David Howe, admitted that medical personnel appeared to be
"holding the wound in an open position."

(TB 9).

Taking

photographs was not a typical emergency room procedure.

(TB 9).

Dr. Howe testified that the injury was not life
threatening, nor was there any protractive loss of the use of his
leg.

Transcript of September 28, 1990, Trial Proceeding

[hereinafter referred to as "TB"] at 11. Although the involved
muscle would not heal "back a hundred percent" and "lose a little
bit of [its] function[,]" Dr. Howe indicated that "it would be hard
to test and [to] show that there's much difference[.]"

(TB 7).

Howe believed that the injury was "probably four inches" in length
and about "an inch and a half to two inches" in depth.
permanent scar would result.

(TB 7).

(TB 5).

A

He also fully explained the

medical procedure used to treat the wound and the type of body parts
potentially effected.

(TB 5-13).

Bruce Ellis cross examined

Dr. Howe, but he did not dispute the doctor's testimony concerning
his opinion of the wound.
Prior to trial, however, Bruce Ellis moved to exclude the
photographs of the wound on many grounds, one of which addressed the
anticipated testimony of Dr. Howe.

(TA 5).

Ellis believed that the

photographs required an appropriate medical foundation, (TA 99), and
the information conveyed by the photographs, if any, could be
established by the more detailed, and less prejudicial, testimony of
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Dr. Howe.

(TA 5).

The court denied the motion, though it

acknowledged the defendant's continuing objection.

(TA 4-5, 100).

After the presentation of evidence, Ellis also moved for a
directed verdict on the aggravated assault charge and for the
opportunity to submit the matter to the jury as a simple assault
charge.

(TB 14).

The court denied his motion.

(TB 16).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in refusing to submit the case to the
jury under the State's theory, aggravated assault, and the
defendant's theory, simple assault. While the court may have
properly refused to grant defendant Ellis' motion for a directed
verdict on the aggravated assault charge, it nonetheless erred in
refusing to allow the jury to consider his lesser included offense
theory.

The evidence presented provided a rational basis for the

simple assault charge, but the trial court's ruling made unavailable
the defendant's theory as a third option for the jury.

The jury

should not have been forced to choose between aggravated assault or
acquittal.
The court also erred in admitting nonessential, cumulative,
and irrelevant photographs of a wound.

The jury instruction on

aggravated assault focused only on whether the defendant used "force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury."

The end result,

and pictures thereof, were irrelevant to proving the element of the
alleged crime.

The only relevant evidence was testimony describing

Bruce Ellis' throwing motion and the circumstances accompanying the
altercation between Ellis and Steven Drew, the injured party.
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By admitting graphic close-ups of the gaping wound, the
court left open the "strong potential for creating unfair
prejudice."

Moreover, prior to trial Bruce Ellis informed the court

of less prejudicial means of depicting the information, if any,
reflected by the photographs.

The State's witnesses, particularly

Dr. Howe, would have addressed any information contained in the
photographs in a manner less inflammatory than the eight (8" X 11")
color pictures.

The photographs were nonessential and had little or

no probative value; they unfairly detracted the jury from the true
focus of the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE JURY TO
CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE
After each party presented their case-in-chief, Mr. Ellis
made the following objection:
Your Honor, the court stated yesterday that I might
make any appropriate motions today rather than
yesterday when the state initially rested.
Your Honor, it would be our motion to dismiss the
aggravated assault count and to ask the court to
submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple
assault in terms of the state's evidence presented.
(TB 14) (emphasis added).

Bruce Ellis then questioned whether the

State "met the prima facie burden of [proving] serious bodily injury
or the likelihood that it [the defendant's actions] would."
(TB 15).

The court denied Mr. Ellis7 motion, believing that the

jury could find that Ellis' actions were likely to create serious
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bodily injury.

(TB 16).

The court erred, however, in not also

permitting the jury to consider Bruce Ellis' theory of simple
assault.

Cf. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) ("The court

must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence
presented to justify sending the question to the jury, . . . if
there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury question
regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury
regarding the lesser offense")
In State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court emphasized the following principles, especially
applicable to the case at bar:
We are not concerned with the reasonableness, nor the
credibility of the defendant's evidence relating to
his claim of self defense. Each party is, however,
entitled to have the jury instructed on the law
applicable to its theory of the case if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it.
Id. at 695.
By denying Mr. Ellis' motion, the trial court precluded the
jury from considering the defendant's theory of the case.

Even if

the jury should have been able to consider the aggravated assault
charge, the court should not have refused "to submit this matter to
the jury as an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's
evidence presented."

(TB 14).

The evidence provided the jury with

a reasonable basis for Ellis' simple assault theory.

(TA 135-157).

The State and the defendant both agreed that Steven Drew
was hit by a jar thrown by Bruce Ellis.
135-64).

See generally (TA 87-115,

The parties disagreed, however, on whether the force used
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was likely to produce serious bodily injury.

The State contended

that Ellis had thrown the jar at Drew in a manner "likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury."

(TA 45-46) (emphasis added);

(T 95).
Bruce Ellis admitted that he threw the jar, (TA 139), and
that Steven Drew had "suffered a scar" (i.e. bodily injury).
But Ellis disputed the element of "seriousness,"1 (TB 15),

(TB 15).

as he did not throw it in a manner likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury.
his wrong hand.

Both parties agreed that Ellis threw it with

(TA 107, 143). Even the "victim" viewed Bruce

Ellis' throwing motion as awkward or unorthodox.

Ellis may have had

"a hell of a fast ball[,]" (TA 107), but Drew nonetheless
acknowledged that Ellis "threw it offhand." (TA 107).
The undisputed testimony could have supported either the
greater offense theory or the lesser included offense theory.

The

jury should have been able to consider the two competing theories in
order to resolve whether the force used was likely to produce
"serious bodily injury," as opposed to "bodily injury."

See

also (TA 3) (wherein the court acknowledged that "one of the issues
is whether or not . . . the force used was likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury. . . .")

1

defense.

Ellis also testified that he had acted in self
(TA 139).
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During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, the trial
court conceded the possibility that the jury could have convicted
Ellis under the lesser included offense:
[Defense counsel]: . . . This is a case where, as we
discussed informally, had a lesser included offense
been submitted, it might well have been that the jury
would have returned a verdict of simple assault.
The Court:

Probably would have—possibly would have.

(TB 45). 2
The court's acknowledgement of the defendant's position
further confirmed the reasonableness of his simple assault theory.
The court did not dispute Ellis' statements regarding his prior
objections, nor did it refute the plausibility of his theory.
Rather, the court's statements reflected the erroneous nature of its
previous decision.

Indeed, the court went on to state:

this crime is certainly nothing, you know, I would
approve of, but it's not like—it's not the crime of
the century, either, you know, get in a fight and you
throw the bottle at somebody; it's pretty bad, but
it's not like robbing a 7-Eleven with a gun or
something. It's horrid, question of bad temper.
(TB 48).

If self defense did not apply, the "bad tempered,"

impulsive act could have been appropriately classified under both
simple assault and aggravated assault.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§ 76-5-102, -103(1)(b) (1990).
Not only did the court err in not allowing the jury to
consider the defendant's theory, the error was compounded by the

See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
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fact that the theory pertained to a lesser included offense.

The

standard for determining whether to instruct a jury on a lesser
included offense is a two pronged analysis.
[The instruction] must be given if (i) the statutory
elements of greater and lesser included offenses
overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides
a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense."
State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v.
Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)
(1990).
The first prong was satisfied by the plain language of the
statutes.

The "simple" assault statute states, inter alia; "Assault

is: (a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; (b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (c) an act,
committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury
to another."

Utah Code Ann. §

76-5-102 (1990).

The "aggravated

assault" statute reads in relevant part, "A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he: (a) intentionally causes bodily injury to another;
or (b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the overlapping elements of the greater and lesser
included offenses satisfied the initial requirement.

Cf. State v.

Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) ("the test is whether the
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elements overlap at all"); State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d
1130, 1133 (1937) ("There can be no doubt that a charge of assault
with intent to do bodily harm, includes also a simple assault,
because that assault must be proved as a necessary element of the
greater offense").
The second prong, the rational basis test, should be
considered in light of the principles announced in State v. Hansen,
734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).

The Hansen Court interpreted the two

pronged analysis as one which "should be liberally construed," 734
P.2d at 424, especially where, as here, the defendant requested the
lesser included offense instruction.3

Id. at 424 n.5; State v.

3

Initially, Bruce Ellis moved "to dismiss the aggravated
assault count and to ask the court to submit this matter to the Jury
as an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence
presented. (TB 14) (emphasis added). His motion thus contained a
dual request. After Ellis had questioned the "serious" element of
the crime, (TB 14-16), the court denied his motion. (TB 16). In
response to the court's ruling, Ellis noted his present intention
for the record: "We've not—we're not offering a lesser included
offense, so I believe that the court should find that a jury cannot
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the state has proved its case,
and should direct a verdict of not guilty." (TB 16).
Upon a cursory review of these statements, Ellis appeared
to not request the lesser included offense. After a more thorough
examination of the language used, however, Ellis' statement
("we're") reflected only his present intention. His initial
statement ("We've") concerning his past intention was quickly
corrected in deference to the motion already denied by the court.
Moreover, he also moved to forward the same theories, aggravated
assault and simple assault, on the basis that a "not guilty" verdict
should be rendered for the aggravated assault charge. (TB 16)
(Ellis moved "for a directive verdict on forwarding the same
theories, your Honor, that this court should direct a verdict of
. . . not guilty [on the crime alleged]"); cf. (TA 45). Finally, as
reflected by subsequent statements by the court, the propriety of
the defendant's earlier request for a lesser included offense was
never disputed. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
- 13 -

Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Chesnut. 621
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) ("If there [is] any evidence, however slight,
on any reasonable theory of the case under which defendant might be
convicted of a lesser included offense, the trial court must, if
requested, give an appropriate instruction").

In addition:

The [two pronged test] of [State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 159 (Utah 1983)] is not a mere technical rule
designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves
a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a
defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts,
rather than forcing it to elect between the charges
the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal. As
we recognized in Baker, "[w]here one of the elements
of the offense charged remains in doubt but the
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury
is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction."
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted
and emphasis in original).
Assuming, arguendo, the jury properly rejected Bruce Ellis7
claim of self defense, the jury still could have rationally viewed
the evidence under either the State's theory, aggravated assault,
cf. State ex. rel. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), or
Mr. Ellis' theory, simple assault.

£f. Keeble v. United States, 412

U.S. 205, 208 (1973) ("it is now beyond dispute that the defendant
is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the
evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the
lesser offense and acquit him of the greater"); compare Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990).
If Ellis' actions evidenced his intent to stop Steven Drew—or even
an intent to cause "bodily injury," cf. (T 143), the jury may have

- 14 -

nonetheless found that the evidence did not reveal an intent to use
"force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury."

(R 69).

The rational basis prong was satisfied by the testimony of either
the State's witnesses or the defendant, all of whom gave different
interpretations of the "likely to produce serious bodily injury"
element of the alleged crime.

Cf. State v. Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551,

553-54 (Utah 1984) (if "overlapping exists and the evidence is
ambiguous and susceptible to alternative interpretations, the trial
court must give a lesser included offense instruction if any one of
the alternative interpretations provides both a 'rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense'").
The jury, not having been given the opportunity to consider
the lesser included offense, was forced to choose between
"aggravated assault" and "acquittal."

If the jury disbelieved the

claim of self defense, it had no other choice but to convict Bruce
Ellis of aggravated assault.
to make such a determination.

The court erred in requiring the jury
See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.

205, 213 (1973) ("We cannot say that the availability of a third
option—convicting the defendant of simple assault—could not have
resulted in a different verdict"); cf. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d
421, 428 (Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced choice
that lesser included offense instructions are designed to avoid, and
exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to make if [the
lesser included offense] instruction had been given"); State v.
Oldroyd. 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984) ("if the evidence offered in
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the case would permit a jury to find a defendant guilty of the
lesser offense and not guilty of the greater, due process requires
that a lesser included offense instruction must be given").
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING UNNECESSARILY THE
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S WOUND
Another motion made by Bruce Ellis concerned the
admissibility of State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8, the gruesome photographs
depicting Steven Drew's wound.

(TA 99-100, 116-117).

The trial

court declined to exclude the photographs, stating:
I have looked at the photographs and determined that
because one of the issues is whether or not the injury
initiated or the force used was likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury, since that's the
issue, the State must prove everything. The
photographs are relevant. They're not so gruesome in
my opinion as to outweigh the prejudicial effect;
doesn't outweigh the probative value, consequently the
motion to exclude those exhibits will be denied.
[The State then added]: Your Honor, for the record, I
believe . . . M s . Wells indicated to the court that
she thought the Lafferty homicide standard should
apply, and it is my understanding the court said no.
The Court: That's right. I think it is a different
situation. If you have photographs of a corpse, they
are not directly relevant because everyone agrees the
person is dead. How serious the injury was is not an
issue. Where the issue is, [was] the assault [likely
to] produce serious bodily injury, I think the
standard is different and I don't think the Lafferty
case applies.
(TA 3-4); (R 69).

The court erred in its decision because it

misunderstood the applicable law.
In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court considered whether "the trial court erred in admitting
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certain photographs during the [trial]."

Id. at 1256.

The Court

initially reviewed the governing evidentiary rule, Utah R.
Evid. 403, which provides:

"Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
cited in Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1256.

Utah R. Evid. 403

The Court interpreted the

rule's language as requiring more than "a simple balancing of
probative value and potential for unfair prejudice[.]"

749 P.2d at

1256.
our past decisions have recognized that inherent in
certain categories of relevant evidence is an
unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice,
inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in these
categories is uniquely subject to being used to
distort the deliberative process and improperly skew
the outcome. Consequently, when evidence falling
within such a category is offered, we have required a
showing of unusual probative value before it is
admissible under rule 403. In the absence of such a
showing, the probative value of such evidence is
presumed to be "substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice."
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added).

The presumption is therefore in favor

of excluding the evidence unless the State shows the "unusual
probative value" of the evidence.

Id.

In other words, "potentially

prejudicial photographs are 'generally inappropriate' and should not
be admitted in evidence unless they have some essential evidentiary
value that outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact. . . Only
after a determination has been made that the photographs have such
value need the weighing be made."

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753
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(Utah 1986) (construing State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983))
(emphasis added).
Cloud and Garcia were only two of the many "past decisions"
referred to by the Laffertv Court as cases subject to the
"essentiality" requirement.

See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498,

501 (Utah 1986) (statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to
quantitative analysis, such as veracity of a witness); State v.
Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980) (a rape victim's past sexual
activities with someone other than the accused); see generally
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 n.14 (Utah 1988).

The

"essentiality" requirement is not applied differently to homicide
cases.

The requirement applies to any evidence, however relevant,

which is "being used to distort the deliberative process and
improperly skew the outcome."

Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256.

In the case at bar, the trial court never addressed the
"essentiality" requirement.

Instead, the court understated the

nature of the involved issue.

The issue4 was not simply whether

"the force used was likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury[.]"

(TA 3).

Rather, the issue focused on whether the State

had established the "essential" nature of the photographs and their
"unusual probative value."
"The point of the reference to 'essential evidentiary
value' in the context of potentially prejudicial photographs of the

4

photographs.

The threshold issue pertained to the relevancy of the
See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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victim's body is that such photographs would generally be
inappropriate where the only relevant evidence they convey can be
put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not
accompanied by the potential prejudice.

State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d

60, 64 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original); cf. State v. Laffertv,
749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988) ("An important consideration in
assessing the probative value of a photograph is whether the facts
shown by the photograph can be established by other means").
During his motion to exclude the photographs, Bruce Ellis
informed the court that the State had other means available for
establishing the alleged facts:

"we believe the State could prove

anything that the photographs are likely to show [through] their
other types of testimony, specifically the testimony of the medical
expert who will be called who has the ability to utilize diagrams
and/or models."

(TA 5).

The court did not comment on the

defendant's argument, nor did it modify its prior decision to
exclude the photographs.

(TA 5).

Thereafter, as predicted by

Mr. Ellis, the testimony of the State's witnesses established any
and all relevant5 facts which could have been conveyed by the

5

Bruce Ellis objected to the testimony of Dr. David
Howe, the surgeon who treated Steven Drew, when Howe testified about
the injury which could have resulted. (TB 6). The doctor's
testimony was irrelevant to the "likely to produce" element of the
alleged crime. The doctor knew nothing about the circumstances
surrounding the incident or the throwing motion used by the
defendant. His testimony, all in regards to the "end result" or the
"could-have-been-result," further exacerbated the potential for
misleading the jury.
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nonessential photographs.

The court erred in not finding that the

"essentiality" requirement, referred to in Laffertv, precluded the
admissibility of the photographs.

The trial court also erred in

finding that the photographs were "not so gruesome in my opinion as
to outweigh the prejudicial effect; doesn't outweigh the probative
value, consequently the motion to exclude those exhibits will be
denied."

(TA 4).

As stated above, more than "a simple balancing of

probative value and potential for unfair prejudice" was required.
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988).

A "showing of

unusual probative value" was required before the evidence could be
admitted.

Id. (emphasis added).
The trial court did not apply the appropriate legal

analysis.

A routine balancing test was not enough.

Absent a

showing of unusual probative value, the photographs were "presumed
to be 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudicef.]'"

Id.

The State did not make the requisite showing,

nor did the court make the requisite finding.
More importantly, the court's statements presumed that the
photographs had "probative value" when, in fact, they had no
relevance6 whatsoever under the instructions considered by the
jury.

In order to convict Mr. Ellis, Instruction No. 11 required

the jury to find, "That said defendant then and there intentionally,

6

The photographs and all testimony on anything other
than the throwing motion of the defendant were irrelevant to the
"likely to produce" element of the Information and the jury
instruction. (R 27, 61, 69); (TA 45).
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knowingly, or recklessly, used a deadly weapon or such means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury to Steve
Drew."

(R 69) (emphasis added); see Addendum B.

irrelevant to the jury's determination.

(R 69).

The end result was
In other words, if

Bruce Ellis had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly thrown the
drinking jar but missed Steven Drew, Ellis still could have been
held accountable for his actions.
-103(1)(b) (1990).

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102,

As explained by the trial court:

the question is not whether it was serious bodily
injury, it was whether it was likely. I mean, if
[someone uses] a gun and it doesn't happen to hurt
them, that's still aggravated assault. If they shoot
them with a pea shooter and it kills them, that's not.
(TB 15).
The court's statements, though contradicted by its ruling,
properly focused on the likelihood of the injury—and not on the
result.

(i.e. whether the mens rea and actus reus of the defendant

combined together in a manner "likely to produce" death or serious
bodily injury.)

Perhaps, a multi-framed pictorial depicting the

defendant's motion and delivery in throwing the drinking jar would
have addressed the element of "force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury," (R 69), but photographs taken after the
throw would not have addressed the "likely to produce" element
stated in the instruction.

(R 69).

Accordingly, the court should not have ruled that the
photographs of the wound, taken at the hospital, were admissible
evidence.

(TA 3-4).

They were neither essential, nor relevant to
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the State's prima facie case.

When the court denied Bruce Ellis'

motion to exclude the photographs, it opened the door to the "strong
potential for creating unfair prejudice."
P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988).

State v. Lafferty, 749

The graphic depiction of the wound,

especially State's Exhibits Nos. 6-8, drew the jury's attention away
from the appropriate inquiry concerning the "likely to produce"
element.
Suppose for a moment, that Bruce Ellis used a pea shooter
to shoot a pea at Steven Drew's leg.

A jury should consider only

Ellis' mental state and the accompanying conduct at the time of the
alleged crime.

Even if the pea somehow became lodged in Drew's eye

and blinded him, photographs graphically depicting blood, pus, and a
damaged cornea would unduly detract the jury's focus from the
"likely to produce" element of the crime.

Pictures of the end

result would be irrelevant and serve only to inflame the jury.
Similarly, the eight color photographs (8" X 11") used in
the present case were unduly emphasized by the State because of
their irrelevancy to the proceeding.

State's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8,

and to a lesser extent Exhibit 6, were enlarged closeups of a
gaping, blood stained wound.

Exposing the jury to these "gruesome"

pictures7 could have easily created "unfair prejudice" with its
ensuing impact on the jury.

7

At the very least, State's Exhibits Nos. 6-8 should
have been inadmissible. They had the greatest potential for
prejudicially affecting the jury.
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"A conviction will not be reversed because of the erroneous
admission of evidence absent a showing that the error likely
affected the substantial rights of the defendant."
722 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1986).

State v. Cloud.

The error cannot be deemed harmless

because the State in the case at bar, unlike the State in other
cases, did not have other evidence so overwhelmingly against the
defendant that the error was unlikely to affect his substantial
rights.

Cf. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 1988).

Bruce Ellis did admit throwing the drinking jar at Steven Drew but
neither his testimony, nor the testimony of the State's witnesses
was so overwhelming that, absent the photographs, there was little
or no likelihood of a different outcome.
If the jury had been instructed differently, in regards to
the lesser included offense instruction, see supra Point I, and in a
manner where the end result could have been relevant to their
verdict, cf. (R 69), the error may have been harmless.

In the

present situation, however, the sole consideration relevant to the
jury's fact finding mission pertained to the "force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury. . . . "

(R 69).

Consequently, by exposing the jury to photographs which were
nonessential, cumulative, and irrelevant to the proceeding, their
affect on the jury cannot be deemed harmless.
P.2d 750 (Utah 1986).

State v. Cloud, 722

The trial court therefore abused its

discretion and committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Ellis'
motion to exclude State's Exhibits Nos. 1-8.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this J>[

day of October, 1990.

BROOKE C. WEll
Attorney for-'Defendant/Appellant

RO|T S. FttJINO

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

76-1-402- Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.

76-1-601- Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.

76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

Before you can convict the defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis,
of the crime of Aggravated Assault, you must believe from all the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the
following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 29th of June, 1989, in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis, assaulted Steve
Drew;
2.

That

said

defendant

then

and there

intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly, used a deadly weapon or such means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury to Steve
Drew.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault.

If, on

the other hand, you are not convinced of the foregoing elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not
guilty.
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